Introduction
National health expenditures accounted for 16.3% of the U.S. GDP in 2007 , compared to 5.2% in 1960 (Department of Health & Human Services, 2006 . The rapid growth of medical costs leaves a large fraction of the population without health insurance.
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The lack of insurance has serious negative consequences that include lack of access to needed care, declining health, and the possibility of crushing financial burdens. Uninsured adults are far more likely to postpone accessing health care or to forgo it altogether and are less able to afford prescription drugs or follow through with recommended treatments. A report by the Institute of Medicine (2003) states that the uninsured have a more rapid decrease in general health and a higher risk of dying prematurely than the insured. According to their estimation the cost for diminished health and shorter life span due to lack of insurance was between $65 and $130 billion in 2003. There are also financial externalities imposed by the uninsured on the third party through uncompensated care, whose costs were estimated to be $57.4 billion in 2008 [Hadley et al. (2008) ].
These facts have stirred up various proposals for changing the U.S. health care system and to cover the uninsured. There are many empirical studies that explore the impacts of health care reforms on individual's behavior such as crowding-out by public insurance [e.g.
see Culter and Gruber (1996) , Lo Sasso and Buchmueller (2004) , Gruber and Simon(2008) ], medical usage [Cheng and Chiang (1997) ], and health status [Lurie et al. (1984) , Currie and Gruber (1996) , Hanratty (1996) , Decker and Remler (2005) ]. However, there is a paucity of economic models that address the macroeconomic and welfare implications of reforming the U.S. health care system.
A reform of the health insurance system could potentially affect macroeconomic variables by distorting the labor market through changes in tax rates, reducing the number of uninsured, and raising the aggregate health expenditure. Reforming the health insurance system will affect the household's demand for health insurance. Some individuals may shift from existing private insurance coverage to either the newly subsidized form of private coverage or to public coverage. This in turn alters the pool of agents insured, which affects insurance premiums. Similarly, different insurance decisions result in changing health status and labor productivity, which then will affect wages and hours worked. A change in the labor income 1 17% of the nonelderly in the US was uninsured in 2007 according to Kaiser (2008) . 1 tax may be required to fund the reform, which consequently will influence individual's labor supply decisions. A reform will also change agents' saving behavior (and thus the aggregate capital stock and factor prices) because health insurance may reduce precautionary saving motives. At the same time, better health implies longer life expectancy and thus a higher saving incentive. These complicated tradeoffs can only be fully captured in a general equilibrium framework.
The aim of this study is to analyze the macroeconomic impacts and welfare implications of alternative reforms to the health insurance system in the U.S. I depart from the existing literature by adding endogenous health expenditure and labor-leisure choice, which will capture some important welfare tradeoffs. I consider the following reform proposals:
(i) the expansion of Medicare to the entire population; (ii) the expansion of Medicaid; (iii) an individual mandate; (iv) the removal of the subsidy to purchase the employer-sponsored insurance and to provide a refundable tax credit for insurance purchases. These reforms are building blocks for current proposals for reform. I calibrate my model to the U.S. data. Then, I conduct several policy experiments to shed light on the costs and benefits of changing the health insurance system. Alternative sources of revenue to fund these reforms are also considered. My numerical experiments suggest that general equilibrium effects are substantial, and the impact of various reforms on the social welfare can be quite sizable.
My research is closely related to a number of papers. My model is built upon the classic works of Bewley (1986) , Imrohoroglu (1992) , Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) , which provide a useful framework to study the economy with heterogenous agents and incomplete market. Several papers introduce exogenous health expenditure shocks into Bewley-type models. For example, Palumbo (1999) and De Nardi et al. (2006) incorporate heterogeneity in medical expenses in order to understand the pattern of savings among the elderly. Jeske and Kitao (2009) study the welfare costs of a tax policy change associated with health insurance. Different from these papers, here I consider household' optimal consumption of medical service following the health capital literature in the spirit of Grossman (1972) .
Recent examples include Hall and Jones (2007) , Suen (2006) that explain the rapid growth in health expenditure. Jung and Tran (2008) analyze the effect of the Health Saving Accounts on the health expenditure and individual's insurance decision. All these papers use an inelastic labor supply. In my model, agents make the labor-leisure choice and the government adjusts tax rates to fund the reforms, which creates distortions in the labor supply. My study 2 is thus related to the literature on taxation and labor supply (Prescott (2004 ), Rogerson (2007 ).
I build on this literature in two ways. First and foremost, the focus of my paper is to develop a macroeconomic framework to quantify effects of alternative health care reforms.
The existing literature generally focuses on one specific health related policy. I explicitly model public health insurance so that my model can evaluate a broad set of health care reforms. Second, my model takes into account general equilibrium effects regarding the demand and supply of labor and the consumption of medical services. As I show later, introducing labor-leisure choice provide new insights for understanding the welfare implication of health care reforms. Numerical simulations suggest that the effect of reforms on labor supply is non-negligible.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the OLG model, while section 3 is devoted to the calibration of the utility and production functions with emphasis on some parameters related to health. Section 4 details some reform proposals and presents all numerical results. The last section concludes.
The benchmark model

Demographics
This economy has overlapping generations of agents who live a maximum of three periods as young, middle-aged, and old. Let g ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote the age. In the first period, the measure of newly born agents is normalized to 1. Individuals alive in period t survive to the next period with a certain probability. For old people this probability is always 0. For young and middle-aged people, the survival probability is given by ρ(h g ), which depends on the health status h g at the end of age g as described below. The population of young individuals grows at a constant rate n, implying that the population of young in period t is (1 + n) t . I denote the relative size of age g to the population as µ g , which is determined in the equilibrium.
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Agent types
All individuals enter the economy with the same level of healthh 0 , an idiosyncratic endowment e 0 , and an idiosyncratic health risk types i h . Health risk type determines the probability of drawing a certain health shock ε t ∈ Ω ε = {ε 1 , ..., ε Nε }. The probability distribution of the shock is assumed to be age-type-dependent. Specifically, the probability of drawing ε ∈ Ω ε by type i h agent at age g is denoted by p g,i h (ε), with Σ ε∈Ω ε p g,i h (ε) = 1 for all (g, i h ). A typical history of shocks up to time t is denoted by σ t ≡ {ε 0 , ..., ε t }, with σ t+1 = {σ t , ε t+1 }.
Agents are endowed with a fixed amount of time per period that can be allocated to leisure or labor. Agents participate in the labor market during the first two periods and receive a wage incomewe ζh l. Here ζ measures the effect of health on labor productivity.
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Health is an important form of human capital. It can enhance workers' productivity by increasing their physical capacities, such as strength and endurance, as well as their mental capacities.
I postulate a positive relationship between health and labor productivity.
During their work stage agents receive income in the form of wages and profit Π t from the firm. They can also save a g units of the consumption good using a storage technology with gross rate of return R t+1 = 1 + r. Retired agents have income through previous saving and profit, and consume all of their income at their last period of life.
The type of an agent is a triple (g, i h , x), where g ∈ {1, 2, 3} is age; i h ∈ {healthy, unhealthy} is health risk type; and x ∈ R + is their disposable resources at the beginning of each period which is defined as follows:
Preferences
Preferences over stochastic sequences of consumption, leisure and health are given by
where β denotes the discount factor, ρ survival probability, c consumption, L leisure and h health status. E t denotes the conditional expectation with the information available when the agent is born.
The evolution of health
I use the idea of health capital introduced by Grossman (1972) . In the model, each agent chooses an optimal amount of medical consumption m to offset the negative effect of health shock ε on health and builds up health capital h. The accumulation process of health is
given by: after the health expenditure shock is revealed, independent of their income level and current health stock. I, instead, endogenize medical expenditures. Hence, agents can choose an optimal amount of medical service to build up health stock. Since health expenditure is an endogenous choice, richer agents will spend more on health care to build up better health stock than the poor who has the same health status and faces the same health shocks. This can be explained by the fact that rich individuals have higher levels of consumption and lower marginal utility from consumption goods, therefore they will substitute some health for consumption goods.
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Conditional on being alive at the current age with end of period health stock h, agent will 3 Wobus, Diana Z. and Gary Olin (2005) found that the average health expenditure decreases with income level. This can be reconciled by the following fact. The low income has lower health insurance coverage rate. For people age under 65, the uninsurance rate among person in families with income less than 200% of poverty line is 24.5%, while the number is only 8.7% among person in middle and high income families. The price of medical services is much higher for uninsured due to the cost shifting (see Anderson (2007) ), which implies the medical services utilized by low income families can be less than those used by the rich counterpart.
survive to the next period with probability ρ(h). Death is certain when health falls below zero (ρ(h) = 0 if h ≤ 0). I assume that ρ (h) > 0. Deceased agents leave their savings a as an accidental bequest that is collected by the government as revenues.
Medical expenses and health insurance
Non-elderly can choose one out of three possible insurance states labeled as in = {1, 2, 3}.
To purchase private health insurance is in = 1, in = 2 denotes that the agent has Medicaid, and in = 3 indicates that the agent is uninsured. The out of pocket health expenditure represents the coinsurance rate and varies with the health insurance state in as we discuss in the following subsection. Agents take coinsurance rate as given and it is calibrated from the data. Retired agents are insured under Medicare.
Private health insurance
To simplify the analysis, I only consider the Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance (EHI).
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Even when an employer offers health insurance, not all workers get coverage. Some choose not to enroll, perhaps because they are young or very healthy and feel that health insurance is not a pressing need, and others' incomes are so low that they cannot afford insurance. These tradeoffs will be presented in the benchmark simulation.
Once an agent chooses to purchase EHI a constant premium π E must be paid to the insurance company, and a fraction q E (p m m) of the total medical expenditure will be paid by the health insurance company. The premium is not dependent on prior health history or any individual states. This accounts for the practice that group health insurance does not price-discriminate the insured by such individual characteristics.
Public health insurance
The government provides two type of health insurances, Medicaid and Medicare, to the population. 
The representative agent's problem
A representative agent of generation g = {1, 2} enters each period with characteristics
, where i h is the risk type of the agent, x is the net wealth, h g−1 is the health status at the beginning of the period, and i ma is the indicator function that signals the availability of the Medicaid benefit in the current period. Since all old agents are automatically enrolled in the Medicare program and leave the labor market, their characteristics simply are s 3 = (i h, x, h 2 ). The distribution of households over their state space is given by f g (s g , σ t ), which is endogenously determined in the equilibrium and evolves over time.
Agents observe s g at the beginning of the period. They take prices and taxes as given and make the insurance decision in g (s g ) and choose a set of state-contingent decision rules, ε g )}, to solve the following problem.
subject to the budget constraint and a no-borrowing constraint
when young;
when middle-aged; and
when old, where
(10)
The timeline for the generation who was born in period t is shown in Figure 1 . Each agent 8 Figure 1 : Timeline for the generation born in period t born at t is endowed with e 0 . They save some storage goods {a g (σ t+g−1 , s g )} g=1,2 to attain desirable amounts of consumption. Equation (10) presents the individual's after-Medicaretax adjusted wage rate. Agents survive to the next period with probability ρ(h g ). The firm needs to share the Medicare tax τ mr with the agent. Hence, in equilibrium a fraction 0.5τ mr of tax is subtracted from the wage. Profit Π t will be uniformly distributed to the household as payment as displayed in equation (11). Equations (12) and (13) explain the insurance premium paid by the individual and the coinsurance rate, which vary with his insurance state. Income taxes are imposed on the labor income paid to a worker plus accrued interest on savings and profit from the firm. Equation (14) represents the income tax base, which depends on the agent's age. T (·) is a progressive income tax function.
Aggregate production function
The consumption goods are produced by a neoclassical production function. The aggregate production function takes a nested Cobb-Douglas specification in the following form.
where A t is a total factor productivity, and E t is an aggregate efficiency labor input, which depends on individual worker's health status. The firm's profit maximization problem is max
Profits Π t are distributed back to households in a lump-sum payment.
The government
I impose a government balanced budget constraint period by period. The government has three different types of outlays: general public consumption, Medicaid and Medicare expenses. The government collects revenues from various sources: income taxation according to a progressive tax function T (·), consumption taxation at rate τ c , Medicare taxation at rate τ mr , Medicare premium π mr , Medicaid premium π ma , and accidental bequests B collected from deceased agents.
where y g is the taxable income for age g agent.
Health insurance company
The health insurance company is competitive. Hence, in equilibrium the premium π E is charged such that expected expenditures on the insured are precisely covered.
Notice the coverage ratio function q E (·) is taken as exogenously given. 
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Stationary competitive equilibrium
ii) price for medical services p m ; iii) health insurance choices {in(s g )} g=1,2 , a set of state- 
5. the accidental bequests matches the remaining assets.
6. the aggregate resource constraint holds
7. there is a consistency between beliefs and the actual prices.
the relative size of age g to the population µ g is recursively determined by
µ g = ρ(h g−1 , , ε g−1 )f g−1 ds g−1 1 + n µ g−1(24)
the law of motion for the distribution of agents over the state space S satisfies
f t+1 g = ρ(h g−1 , ε g−1 )f t g−1 ds g−1 (25)
Calibration
In this section I outline the calibration of the model. Table 8 summarizes the values and describes the parameters.
Most parameters can be independently estimated. However, there are 16 parameters that cannot be determined independent of each other as I discuss below. These include parameters of preference over health (γ 3,g , η) , the health production function (A m , ζ), the survival probability function (a ρ , b ρ ), the magnitude of the negative health shock (ε
the probability distribution of the shock p g,i h and the price of medical service p m . Hence, I
use a minimization procedure to determine these parameter values. More specifically, I pick parameter values to match key moments in the stationary distribution of the benchmark model with the real-world statistics listed in Table 12 . Formally, let ψ denotes the vector of parameters, and Γ be the vector of selected real-world moments. Given ψ, a predictionΓ(ψ) on Γ can be computed in the stationary distribution of the benchmark. The minimization procedure can be defined as the following problem:
Data sources
The data used for estimating the process of health insurance decision and health production 
Demographics
In the model, one period is defined as 20 years. Agents enter the economy at the age of 25 (g = 1) and survive up to the maximum age of 85 (g = 3). In line with Suen (2006) , I
assume that the survival probability function ρ(·) takes the form of the cumulative Weibull distribution function:
with a ρ > 0 and b ρ > 0. The endogenous survival probability rules out the case that agents survive to the next period with negative health stock.
I consider a yearly population growth of 1.25%. Together with the survival probability ρ(h), the ratio of retired people to active population (the dependency ratio) is equal to 18.6%
(19.2% according to the 2000 Population Census for the U.S.). The initial level of health when agent enter the economy,h 0 , is assumed to be constant and is normalized to be 100.
Preferences and technology
Agents have period utility over consumption, leisure and health:
The parameter γ 2,g is age-dependent and I choose parameter values such that the average fraction of the time endowment allocated to market work is 0.33, which implies γ 2,1 = 1.3, and γ 2,1 = 0.85. Notice old agents retire from the labor market and they spend all time on leisure. For simplicity I set γ 2,3 = γ 2,1 . γ 3,g , which is age-dependent as is γ 2,g , measures the importance of health and η denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion of health.
The annual subjective discount factor is taken to be 0. 
Production of health and health shocks
The health measure h used in this paper is the Physical The transition of agent's health is described by equation (2). Agents can offset the negative effect of a health shock by purchasing medical care. The productivity of medical care is captured by A m , and the price of medical care is p m . Both are exogenously given. Brown (2006) found that uninsured people in California pay 65% more for common prescription drugs than the federal government does for the same medications. Anderson (2007) found that the uninsured patients pay up to 2.5 times for hospital service than health insurers. I assume that uninsured consumers pay a 60% higher price for medical services than the insured, so that p } and the probability distribution of the shock p g,i h (ε) are chosen so that the health insurance take-up rate (percentage of workers buying private insurance per age-type group) and the share of health expenditure in GDP are approximated.
Health insurance
Private health insurance Data suggests that the coverage rate increases in the health expenditures incurred by the patients. Therefore I assume that the coverage ratio is a function of total health expenditure p m m and takes the following form similar to Jeske and Kitao (2009) .
First, I estimate the set of parameters {β
2 } using the MEPS data. Then I rank the health expenditure and use 5 bins for health expenditure data. I specify the bins of uniform size. Therefore the first bin contains individuals whose health expenditure is between zero and 20-quantile. The 20% who spends the most on health care belongs to the fifth bin. I plug in the health expenditure data to attain the average coverage ratio for each bin.
The coverage ratios of Medicaid and Medicare are estimated by the same procedure. I report the parameter values and coverage ratios for each expenditure grid in table 10 and 11.
In table 11, the standard errors in brackets and all coefficient estimates are significant at the 1% level. The insurance premium π E is determined in the equilibrium to ensure zero profits for the insurance company.
Medicaid I use Medicaid as a proxy of public health insurance for the non-elderly population, which includes S-CHIP. I use the MEPS data to calculate the acceptance rate of Medicaid χ = 0.6. The beneficiaries of Medicaid typically do not pay anything for enrolling in the program. I pick π ma = 0 in the simulation.
Medicaid is funded by general government revenue. The income level characteristic of Medicaid is typically 100% to 133% of the federal poverty line (FPL).
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I set Y ma = $13, 000 or about 34% of annual per capita GDP in the benchmark.
Medicare I assume that every old agent is enrolled in Medicare. Medicare taxes are levied on all labor income and split between employer and employee contributions. The Medicare premium was $799.20 annually in 2004 or about 2.11% of annual GDP. The Medicare tax rate τ mr is determined within the model so that the government budget is balanced.
Firms
I choose a standard labor share in production of α = 0.66 from NIPA. Without loss of generality, total factor productivity is normalized to A = 8 such that the average labor income equals 10 in the benchmark. In line with Bloom and Canning (2005) , I assume that individual worker's health status affects the efficiency of labor input by a factor of e ξh . Therefore, labor income is given by we ξh l, where w is the average wage rate. I estimate the parameter ξ that fits the following equation using the MEPS data. log(LaborIncome) = ξh + log(AverageW age × W orkingHours) + (30) where h is the Physical Component Summary scores that measure the individual's health status ranging from 0 to 100. I normalize the average labor income observed in the data to be 10.0 and I calculate ξ = 0.1393 in the benchmark.
Government
The value for G is exogenously given and is fixed across all policy experiments. I calibrate it to 27.5% to match the share of government consumption, social security and gross investment excluding transfers, at federal, state and local levels (The Economic Report of the President, 2004). The consumption tax rate is 5.67% as in Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) .
The income tax function follows the functional form studied by Gouveia and Strauss (1994) , which is given as My model does not match the wealth distribution accurately even though I introduce idiosyncratic health shock. This can be explained by the fact that agents do not have bequest motive and the profits generated from production have been uniformly distributed back as a lump sum payment in the model economy. Nevertheless, the accuracy of approximation of the entire wealth distribution won't impose strong effect on the prediction of health insurance demand, which will be determined by the fraction of the population whose wealth is below certain threshold. As described in the previous paragraph, the health insurance take-up profile and aggregate health expenditure match with the data fairly well. Therefore I leave the current setting as it is. The following Panel 2 of Figure 2 shows the consumption over various age groups. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) estimated the life-cycle consumption profiles using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. They found that non-durable consumption peaked at age 52 and was about 29% higher than at age 25. The current model is able to generate a similar hump-shaped pattern. However, there is a gap between the benchmark prediction and data. This can be attributed to the fact that there is no capital in the model for the sake of simplification. The direct consequence of this strategy is that the demand for saving is inelastic and therefore part of the government income taxation is distortion free as discussed in section 4.3.
Benchmark model
Policy experiments
I now conduct experiments to determine the effect of reforming the health insurance system.
All potential reforms start from the same initial steady state of the benchmark economy.
In period 1, an unanticipated change of the policy is announced and implemented and the economy starts to make a transition to the new steady state. I first compare moments of associated invariant distributions. Then I discuss the quantitative aspects of the transitions and welfare analysis associated with each of the reforms considered.
I am interested in changes in health expenditure as a ratio of GDP, the change in taxes In each experiment I first compute a steady state outcome under the stationary equilibrium and then the transition dynamics. In line with Conesa and Krueger (1999) , I measure the welfare effect of a reform by computing the consumption equivalent variation (CEV ).
I quantify the welfare change of a given policy reform for an individual of type (i h , x, i ma ) by asking by how much (in percent) this individual's consumption has to be increased in all future periods and contingencies (keeping health expenditure, leisure and health insurance status constant) in the old steady state so that his expected life-time utility equals that under a specific policy reform. I denote it with CEV (i h , x, i ma ). For example, a CEV (i h , x, i ma ) of −10% implies that if the given policy reform is put into place, then an individual of type (i h , x, i ma ) will experience a welfare loss due to the reform equivalent to sacrifice 10% of his consumption in the initial steady state with leisure, health insurance and health expenditure constant at the initial choices.
Alternative sources of revenue to fund these reforms are also considered. I first consider supporting the reform by adjusting the income tax. I also conduct companion experiments where the government funds the reform through a labor income tax and through a lump-sum transfer separately.
Policy experiment A: expansion of Medicare to the entire population
In this experiment the private health insurance and the Medicaid program are abolished.
Non-elderly will be covered by a uniform health insurance program, which is sponsored by the government, with premium π mr and coverage rate q E (·). Specifically, non-elderly pay for a premium that equals 2.1% of the per capita GDP, which is cheaper than the counterpart in the benchmark. Experiment results are summarized in Table 2 . The top section displays some statistics of aggregate variables: the fraction of insured non-elderly, the Medicare tax rate, the average effective income tax rate, average hours worked, average effective working hours, and the health expenditure as a ratio of GDP. The lower section displays the welfare effects of each reform. % w/ CEV > 0 indicates the fraction of agents in the benchmark that would experience a welfare gain (positive CEV ) if the alternative reform is taken place.
Expansion of Medicare to the entire population achieves a universal coverage as shown in the fraction of insured non-elderly. The aggregate health expenditure as a ratio of GDP increases by 0.3%. This is attributed to the fact that those newly insured non-elderly will utilize more medical service and incur higher amount of health expenditure as the reform provides them with cheaper health insurance. The current reform needs to raise tax revenue to cover 15.2% of the non-elderly who would be uninsured in the benchmark and to pay for part of the expenditure of the previously insured, who pay a premium of π mr after the reform, which is about 20.0% of the premium they paid before the reform. The reform also saves some tax revenues through changes in the arrangement in the health care sector. In the benchmark, the government provides Medicaid to the low incomes, which costs 2.2% of total GDP. It also subsidizes the purchase of group insurance and the total subsidy amounts to 0.8% of total GDP. Once the reform is implemented, the government can save these spending, since both Medicaid and private insurance are abolished. Put them together, the government raises the proportional income tax rate by 4.5%, which will discourage labor supply. At the meantime, the individuals have access to better health insurance. Average health has been improved, which brings workers higher productivity and incentive to work longer. Consequently, average hours worked decreases by 4.8% to 28.7 hours per week. Total output decreases by 2.0% as labor supply shrinks and average consumption decreases by 3.0%. Now let's look at the saving behavior. The average health stock of the non-elderly increases, which implies a longer life expectancy and a stronger saving incentive. A decreased exposure to the health shocks lowers the demand for precautionary saving, but this effect is dominated by the previous one and the aggregate saving rate slightly increases by 0.8%.
Although agents are subject to a higher income tax after the reform is implemented, the cheaper health insurance program from the government is enough to compensate this cost for most agents. As shown in % w/ CEV > 0, 72.6% of agents would experience a welfare gain from this reform, and the average welfare effect is in the order of 2.6% in terms of consumption in all states. However, low income agents, especially those covered by Medicaid before the reform, will suffer from this policy because the new insurance program from such a reform is less generous than Medicaid. On average, low income individuals would experience a welfare loss equivalent to 4.3% of consumption. Compared to agents who have income above the poverty line have a welfare gain equivalent to 6.0% of consumption.
In order to understand whether there exists a Pareto-improving variation of the above reform, I also consider experiment A-2. This experiment is similar to A-1 except that all low income agents are covered by Medicaid program. Under such reform, the tax rate needs a bigger increase since the health insurance provided to the low income is more generous than the one in experiment A-1. Consequently, they will consume higher amount of medical services which drives aggregate health expenditure to rise. Nevertheless, the benefit from such a guaranteed Medicaid coverage cannot offset the loss due to a higher tax rate, which is required to provide generous Medicaid program to low income agents. As shown in CEV from transition, agents with income lower than the poverty line still experience a welfare loss, but at a much smaller magnitude of 1.4%. The welfare gain of higher income agents decreases to 21 4.9% from 5.9% in experiment A-1. On average, agents have a welfare gain in the order of 2.8% in terms of consumption in all states. From this experiment, it seems possible to make expansion of Medicare a Pareto-improving program by appropriately funding the reform. A-2: Medicare expansion and keeping Medicaid.
Policy experiment B: expansion of public health insurance
Reform B involves expansion of the public health insurance, including Medicaid/S-CHIP [Gruber (2006) ]. Approaches that follow this model generally build on existing public programs by raising income limits to include more needy people and do away with all tests of eligibility except income. In experiment B-1, I increase the Medicaid offer rate to χ = 1, compared to a probability of 0.6 in the benchmark, i.e. the new Medicaid program covers all the low income but not just eligible low income parents and children as required in the current system. While in experiment B-2, I leave categorical requirement of Medicaid unchanged and increase the maximum income requirement to 300% of the poverty line. I report experiment results in Table 3 .
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The spending in Medicaid as a ratio of GDP increases from 1.7% to 2.5% when the government extends Medicaid to include all low income. These newly insured consume more medical services because Medicaid provides them with better insurance coverage. Aggregate health expenditure increases by 0.3% and the proportional income tax rate has been raised by 1.5% to match this spending. Average hours worked decreases by 1.3% even though the labor productivity has been improved due to better health. Medicaid expansion alone cannot achieve "universal health care". This reform will leave 10.5% of the non-elderly without insurance coverage. Those are agents in better health condition who think insurance is not critical important to them.
When the government increases the maximum income requirement in experiment B-2, some previously insured agents will choose to apply for Medicaid because Medicaid is the best insurance money can buy, even though they will face the risk of being uninsured because of the categorical requirement of Medicaid. Consequently, the insured as a fraction of non-elderly decreases to 81.2%. Similar to the preceding experiment, the aggregate health expenditure increases but with a slightly bigger magnitude since the generous Medicaid needs to cover a larger fraction(18.0%) of the non-elderly population. Average health outcome is better than after experiment B-1 is taken place. Nevertheless, the aggregate hours worked decreases by 3.0% as income tax has been increased by 6.0% to fund this reform.
Compared to the benchmark, policy B-1 is intended to be beneficial for agents with income below the poverty line. These agents are qualified to Medicaid with a certain probability determined by the categorical requirement of this program in the benchmark. Now they benefit from this reform with a guaranteed public insurance coverage and pay a cost in terms of a higher income tax. Given the small size of the program, the benefit is enough to compensate for the loss due to the tax increment. They experience a welfare gain in the order of 1.3% in terms of consumption in all states. For high income agents, their health benefits are intact after the reform since they are not qualify for Medicaid, but they subject to a higher income tax to support the expanded Medicaid program. Their welfare loss is equivalent to 1.1% in terms of consumption in all states.
It is interesting to compare policy B-1 with A-2 especially for poor agents. Even though both reforms provide a guaranteed Medicaid to low income agents, they will vote for B-1 since this policy only incurs a slight increase in income tax to expand Medicaid to a small fraction of the population.
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To increase the maximum income requirement makes everybody worse off. Agents whose income is below the existing maximum income requirement have the same public insurance coverage as in the benchmark. However they are required to pay for a higher tax rate to fund the expanded Medicaid. As a consequence, they experience a welfare loss of the order of 2.7% in terms of consumption in all states. High income agents benefit from the reform with a chance of being covered by Medicaid depending on their income level. While the cost of higher income tax cannot be offset by this benefit. Consequently, they experience a welfare loss of the order of 1.6% in terms of consumption, which is in a smaller magnitude compared with low income agents who do not benefit from this reform. 
Policy experiment C: individual mandate
In this experiment those agents who are uninsured in the benchmark are forced to purchase private insurance. Their entry into the insurance market makes the risk pool more inclusive and drives the insurance premium to drop by 12.0%. The aggregate health expenditure as a ratio of GDP rises to 17.1% as the insurance coverage increases. The aggregate health 24 status becomes better and the average working hours increases by 0.2% even though the reform requires an higher income tax rate since the tax deductibility has been extended to previously uninsured. In terms of welfare, an individual mandate makes everybody worse off.
Such a reform imposes a higher income tax rate since more individuals will deduct premiums from income taxes. This cost cannot be offset by the cheaper insurance resulting from a more inclusive risk pool. On average, agents experience welfare loss at the order of 0.6% of consumption in all states. Among low income agents, only a small fraction holds private insurance since most of them are covered by Medicaid. Consequently they benefit less from the cheaper insurance and they experience a welfare loss at the magnitude of 1.3% in terms of consumption in all states, compared with a loss at the order of 0.3% for high income agents. Compared with the above experiments, policy experiment D-1 is a market-based reform rather than a government program. Under this experiment, the deductibility of the insurance premium for income tax is removed. The taxable income does not depend on the insurance 25 status and it is given as follows
Experiment results are summarized in Table 5 . Removing the subsidy in D-1 leads to a partial collapse of the private insurance market as found by Jeske and Kitao (2009) . The fraction of non-elderly who purchase private insurance falls from 72.5% to 37.5%.
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More than 1/3 of the non-elderly opt out of the private insurance market and choose to be self-insured.
Those are healthy agents who face a lower probability of suffering a bad health shock. The exit of these agents out of the insurance market deteriorates the risk pool and the price of the private insurance jumps by 15%. The aggregate health expenditure as a ratio of GDP falls by 1.2% because taking away the tax deductibility reduces over-investment in health. The income tax rate falls as the income base increases with the removal of the tax deductability for premium. Average working hours slightly increase by 0.5%.
In experiment D-2, the government replace the tax deduction with a $2, 500 credit that does not depend on income as proposed in McCain's health care plan. The tax deduction favors the wealthy since they have a higher marginal income tax rate. A tax credit creates incentives for individuals to purchase private insurance. The fraction of insured non-elderly jumps to 94.2%. Consequently, the price of private insurance falls to 9.7% of per capita GDP and the health expenditure rises to 16.9% of GDP.
In terms of welfare, the removal of the tax deductability is welfare improving, as 74.0%
of the young would experience a welfare gain. This reform improves the social welfare by providing a better allocation of available resource including health care and leisure time.
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It also benefits agents with a lower tax rate on income. These are enough to compensate for the welfare loss due to the lower insurance coverage and increased exposure to health shocks.
On average a young individual will experience a welfare gain in the order of 1.8% in terms of consumption in all states. In D-2, A tax credit to private insurance buyers would encourage health insurance market participation. The proportional tax rate τ y is higher than in the benchmark due to the tax credit. The welfare loss from tax distortion cannot be offset by the benefit from the decreased exposure to health shocks. A typical consumer would have a welfare loss equivalent to 0.2% in terms of consumption in all states.
Bench 
Alternative approaches of funding the reforms 4.3.1 To fund reforms by a labor income tax
In order to understand how the macroeconomic effects of these proposals change in response to how the government finances the reform, I also consider funding the reform by changing the Medicare tax τ mr . Now, government expenditure G, consumption tax rate τ c and the progressive part of income tax function T (·), as well as the proportional tax rate τ y remain unchanged from the benchmark. The government adjusts the Medicare tax rate τ mr to 27 balance the budget.
As shown in average working hours in table 6, to fund the reform through labor income tax creates stronger distortions compared with income taxes.
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Notice I change some policy targets in order to make the experiment meaningful. In experiment A, the Medicare premium doubles from 2.1% of GDP to 4.2%. Otherwise the labor income tax rate will skyrocket and partially crash the labor market as some agents will leave the market. To finance the reform with labor income tax requires τ mr to increases from 2.5% to 7.9%. As a consequence, average hours worked decreases by 5.6%. The welfare of a typical agent decreases compared to the case when the government finances the reform through the gross income tax. 10 There is no capital in my model. The profit Π is distributed back to the agent as a payment, which is inelastic supply to the individual. The interest rate is exogenous and the demand for saving is inelastic as well. Furthermore, the tax base of income tax is broader than labor income tax. These facts explain why taxing labor income creates more distortion than taxing gross income.
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D-2: Abolish private insurance deductibility from income tax base and provide tax credit for purchasing private insurance.
Given the relatively small size of the Medicaid program, public insurance expansion (experiment B-1, B-2) requires a gradual increase in the Medicare tax. Average hours worked decrease by 4.6% in B-1 and 6.5% in B-2 (1.3% and 0.9% when the reforms are funded through income taxes). Again, welfare decreases compared to the experiments when the government funds the reform through an income tax.
Similar to experiment A, I reduce the tax credit to $500 in D-1 and D-2. When reform D-1 is funded through the labor income tax, a larger tax rate drop (because of the smaller tax base of labor income) leads to a 6.7% rise in average working hours. The typical agent experiences a welfare gain whose magnitude is twice than in the case when the reform is funded by income tax. Now let's look at the experiment D-2. Even though the tax credit is much smaller than in the case when the reform is funded through income tax, we still observe a 3.3% drop in hours worked. All of these suggest that to fund the reforms through labor income tax creates stronger distortion.
To fund reforms by a lump-sum transfer
The analysis so far indicates that the change in taxes may play a dominant role in how health care reforms affect the macroeconomy. In order to isolate the effect of tax distortion, I also conducted companion exercises in which the government funds the reform through a lump sum transfer. In the companion experiments, the tax rates are kept intact as in the benchmark. The government returns a lump sum transfer to each individual. The transfer is determined so that the government's budget is balanced.
Numerical results in Table 7 indicate that the labor supply effect of health care reforms is rather small. The greatest change in hours worked is observed in experiment D-1, in which the hours worked decreases by 2.3%, compared to an average 4.0% change when the reforms are funded through the income tax. Nevertheless, reforms to the health insurance system have quite sizeable effects on the welfare. Medicare expansion increases welfare by improving health status and reducing adverse selection in the health insurance market.
While expansion of Medicaid and individual mandate decreases welfare by distorting health insurance purchase and health expenditure decision, even thought average health status has been improved after reforms are carried out.
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Overall, reforms that can decrease the number of uninsured (as in A-1, A-2, B-1, C, and D-2) will improve the aggregate health status. As the insured consume more medical service, the aggregate health spending rises as well. Better health encourages labor supply as labor productivity increases following improved health. As shown in experiment C, average hours worked increases by 0.7% as average health increases by 0.5%. Among the reforms I considered, only experiment B-2 and D-1 fail to decrease the number of the uninsured. Aggregate health expenditure decreases as fewer people have insurance coverage in experiment D-1.
The average health stock falls as well. In experiment D-1, poorer health discourages labor supply and the average hours worked decreases by 2.3%, which is non-eligible. 
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In this paper, I build up a micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium model to study the impact of alternative health care reforms on the aggregate labor supply, health expenditures, savings, welfare, and the fraction of uninsured population. In contrast to some papers in the literature, I consider a model with a labor-leisure choice as well as a health expenditure decision. These latter choices may change the demand for medical services, which in turn affects the individual's health status and labor productivity. Moreover, financing reform may create distortions on the labor supply by requiring additional tax revenues. The magnitude of the distortion depends on the details of the reform as well as the funding method.
The following important tradeoffs should be considered when evaluating alternative approaches to reform the U.S. health insurance system: the reduction in the number of uninsured population, labor market distortions, and the cost of raising public funds to cover government programs. These complicated tradeoffs can only be fully captured in a general equilibrium framework, similar to the one employed in my analysis. My results suggest that the Medicare expansion and the individual mandate are good candidates for achieving universal health care, while a removal of the tax subsidy to purchase private insurance would result in a significant reduction in the insurance coverage. For all proposals studied, the aggregate health expenditure rises as the insured population increases. Funding the reform through payroll taxes does not seem promising because such a policy can heavily distort the labor market, especially in the cases of expanding Medicare or providing a tax credit to the insured.
Depending on the details of the reforms and how they are funded, I find that the impact of various reforms on the aggregate labor supply ranges between −9.1% and 6.8%. In some reforms, such as the expansion of Medicare to the entire population and the expansion of Medicaid, cheaper insurance means a better health risk pool, lower premiums and better health, which in turn increases labor productivity and hours worked. However, some reforms require higher taxes which result in lower working hours, as for instance in the expansion of Medicare and the individual mandate. The expansion of Medicaid funded with income taxes results in the smallest change in hours worked because the government only needs to collect tax revenue to include about 5% of the non-elderly into the public insurance program.
Conversely, the change with the strongest impact on hours worked is the removal of the tax 31 subsidy to purchase the group insurance funded through the labor tax. This is because a larger fraction of non-elderly (72.5%) pay a tax for the insurance premium, which is income tax free in the benchmark. Consequently, a lower labor tax rate is needed to balance the government budget.
I also find that an increase in insurance coverage does not always improve social welfare.
Here, social welfare is measured in terms of the consumption equivalent variation (CEV), and the impact of various reforms varies between −3.5% and 3.8%. Both Medicare expansion and the individual mandate can achieve universal insurance coverage. Medicare expansion improves the aggregate welfare by offering cheaper insurance. In contrast, the individual mandate may deteriorate welfare even though the risk pooling becomes more inclusive and the premiums go down as agents are forced to purchase insurance. In this case, the government needs to increase other taxes so that the newly insured can enjoy the subsidy for purchasing insurance. In the case of the removal of the tax subsidy to purchase private insurance, agents become better off by providing a better allocation of available resource including health care
and leisure time and lowering the tax rate, which is enough to compensate the cost due to the lower insurance coverage and increased exposure to health shocks.
Since the purpose of the paper is to focus on the effects of reforming the health insurance system, I have chosen not to alter the health production sector along the transition. However, as the demand for medical services may change after a reform is implemented, the supply side may be affected as well. An interesting extension of the current paper would be to ask how productivity in the medical sector and the price of medical services are determined and how they will be affected by these health insurance reforms.
Computation algorithm to stationary equilibrium
Given the parameter values as shown in the text, I compute the stationary equilibrium as follows:
Step 1. Discretize the state space S = (i h , x, h, i ma , ε).
Step 2. Start with an arbitrary pair of the steady state values of aggregate labor supply E, tax rate τ mr , bequest B, and private health insurance premium π E . Define
Compute the value of wage w.
Step 3. Agents solve their optimization problem.
Step 4. Simulate the economy: 
